In this paper, we study representative democracy, one of the most popular classes of collective decision-making mechanisms, and contrast it with direct democracy. In a direct democracy, individuals have the opportunity to vote over the alternatives in every choice problem the population faces. In a representative democracy, the population commits to a candidate ex ante who will then make choices on its behalf.
Introduction
Direct democracy is a fundamental principle of collective decision-making. When a choice problem arrives, individuals should have the opportunity to express preferences over the alternatives. A good decision-making rule then aggregates these preferences into a choice that re ‡ects the will of the group. While many aspects of social decision-making have been debated, this individual right to direct participation has remained a normative ideal from both a theoretical and popular standpoint.
Yet, despite its normative appeal, direct democracy is relatively rare in practice. Just over half of the states in the United States allow for recalls and/or popular referendums and no forms of direct democracy exist at the federal level (NCSL.org). Direct democracy plays a similarly minor role in the governments of countries around the world, with the well-studied exception of Switzerland (Frey 1994) . Most institutions instead take the form of representative democracies, under which elected o¢ cials make decisions on behalf of the electorate. From a practical perspective, representative democracies have an edge over direct democracies as they dramatically reduce transaction costs and shift the burden of decision-making to a small group of well-informed leaders. The question, then, is whether representative democracy, with its practical advantages, can successfully implement the choices that would be reached under the more normatively attractive direct democracy. This paper tackles this question from a theoretical perspective. The …rst and most crucial step of our analysis is to build models of both of these forms of governance. We begin with a population of individuals with strict preferences over a …nite set of alternatives. Then, we develop and apply theories of how outcomes are reached under each system: how alternatives are chosen under direct democracy and how candidates are elected under representative democracy. With these models in place, we ask whether the choices made by the population via direct democracy are preserved under representative democracy.
Our goal is to construct models of direct and representative democracy that are as similar to each other as possible, so that we may study the case that is most likely to lead to positive results. As we describe below, both models depend only on individuals'preferences over pairs of alternatives. Thus, our theories map the same preference information from the population into two sets of outcomes.
We take a majoritarian approach to modeling both direct and representative democracy. Majoritarianism requires pairwise comparisons of alternatives, with the majority preference dictating the social decision. In addition to being a widely-implemented and well-accepted political principle, majoritarianism has been shown to be the collective decision-making rule that works best over the largest class of domains (Dasgupta Maskin 2008) . We use tournament theory, a classic approach to modeling majoritarian systems (Laslier 1997) . Under tournament theory, we …rst compare all alternatives pairwise. Then, we use this complete set of pairwise comparisons to determine the winners.
We use the tournament generated by majority rule over alternatives to analyze outcomes under direct democracy. Under this system, alternatives are compared pairwise, with the majority preference dictating the winner of each contest. We focus on populations whose majority rule tournaments have no cycles. When there are no cycles in the majority rule tournament, there exists a clear ranking of alternatives, with each alternative majoritypreferred to all others below it in the ranking.
In our model of representative democracy, members of the population vote over candidates rather than alternatives. To simplify our setting, we de…ne a candidate as an ordinal ranking of alternatives: a binding, contingent plan of action for future choice problems. We assume that when a choice problem of alternatives arrives, the social decision is made according to the ordering of the elected candidate.
The key modeling assumption is how individuals vote over candidates. We map individuals'preferences over alternatives into preferences over candidates by assuming that an individual votes for the candidate with whom she is most likely to agree about the choice from a randomly-selected pair of alternatives. While we could determine preferences over candidates in other ways, this method parallels the direct democracy case in a unique way. In this version of representative democracy, individuals vote for candidates solely based upon the decisions those candidates would make in choice problems that consist of pairs of alternatives. These are exactly the choice problems faced by individuals in the direct democracy tournament. Therefore, individuals'pairwise preferences over alternatives completely determine both their votes over alternatives and over candidates.
Once we know individuals'preferences over candidates, we can compare these candidates pairwise. In a comparison of two candidates, the winning candidate is the candidate who earns a majority of the population's votes: the candidate with whom the majority of the population is most likely to agree. This type of political action generates a new type of tournament, a tournament over the candidates.
These models provide a method for mapping the preferences of the population into two distinct tournaments: a tournament over alternatives and a tournament over candidates. Each tournament is a complete, asymmetric binary relation. That is, the tournament describes all possible pairwise comparisons within the set. This information provides the basis for determining which alternatives or which candidates would be the winners under majoritarian voting methods. In the simplest case, there will be an alternative or candidate that defeats all others in pairwise comparisons, a Condorcet winner. In these cases, it is easy to see that any majoritarian method will elect the Condorcet winner. Indeed, for our tournaments over alternatives, because we focus exclusively on populations whose majority preferences do not cycle, there will always be a Condorcet winner of the tournament. However, the tournaments over candidates generated by these same populations may cycle. Identifying the winners of these tournaments is non-trivial.
We use the uncovered set of the tournament as our solution concept. The uncovered set has several nice theoretical properties: it is a subset of the top cycle, it is Condorcet consistent, it contains no Pareto dominated alternatives, and it contains most other popular tournament solution concepts (Miller 1980 , Laslier 1997 . From an applied standpoint, the uncovered set is a useful tournament solution concept because it characterizes the outcomes under many familiar majoritarian voting methods (Miller 1980, Shepsle and Weingast 1984) . For example, Miller (1980) shows that the uncovered set contains the set of electable candidates under a simple model of two-party electoral competition.
With this machinery in place, we can address the question of whether representative democracy achieves the same outcomes as direct democracy. For example, suppose a population has a transitive majority preference over three alternatives: a 1 a 2 a 3 . In this case, we ask whether the winning candidate under representative democracy is the ordering a 1 a 2 a 3 , since this candidate would make the same choices as the population does under direct democracy.
We …nd that for problems with a small number of alternatives, representative democracy does succeed in electing candidates that implement the choices made under direct democracy. We show that when there are only three alternatives, if majority rule over the alternatives is consistent with an ordering, then this ordering is the sole member of the uncovered set of the tournament over candidates. Thus, our models predict that direct and representative democracy lead to the same choices for these small problems.
But, for general problems, we derive a negative result. We show that even for the most well-behaved populations, where majority preferences over the alternatives are consistent with an ordering, representative democracy may not elect the candidate with this ordering. That is, when given a chance to commit ex ante to a binding plan of action, the population may select a plan which contradicts the majority preferences on some choice problems. This result is surprising in light of the fact that both tournaments depend only on the population's pairwise preferences over alternatives. Our models of direct and representative democracy operate on the same preference information and arrive at di¤erent outcomes.
Importantly, the failure of representative democracy that we identify here fundamentally di¤ers from many of the existing negative results in the …elds of social choice and political economy. Our negative result arises in the case where preference aggregation is typically least problematic: when there are no cycles in majority rule over alternatives. Thus, it is clear that the divergence of outcomes under direct and representative democracy does not stem from a tension between matching majority preferences over alternatives and producing a social ordering.
We can provide intuition for our result with a simple example. Consider a community that needs to make spending decisions. There are …ve possible projects that the community could fund: they could build a new school, repair a local road, improve the public library, give raises to public employees, and/or restore a historic landmark. For simplicity, let's assume that the community has the budget to fund all …ve projects, so the problem is not about how to allocate scarce funds: they can fund as many (or as few) projects as they would like. Individuals in this community each have a preference about which projects should be funded. In this basic example, we will describe an individual's preference as just a yes/no vote on each issue. For example, an individual might have the preference, "yes"on building the new school and repairing the local road, but "no"on the other three projects.
In Figure 1 , we depict the distribution of preferences in the community. This 19,000-person community can be thought of as having two groups, or parties. There is a prospending group, consisting of 9,000 voters, each of whom prefers to fund all …ve projects (depicted in light gray). The rest of the community consists of voters that are, generally speaking, anti-spending (depicted in black). This anti-spending group is more diverse. It consists of …ve di¤erent smaller groups of voters, each consisting of 2,000 members. Within each of these groups, the voters mostly prefer to not spend money on these projects -however, they each have one pet project they would like to see the community fund. For example, a voter within the anti-spending group might vote yes for building the new school, but no on the four other issues.
This community could make decisions via direct democracy. For instance, when deciding whether or not to build the new school, they hold a town hall meeting. Members of the community attend the meeting and cast a vote of yes or no for whether or not to build the school. The majority preference then dictates the community's decision. A separate vote of this type is done for each spending project, giving each community member the opportunity to vote for or against each project. Under this system, it is clear to see that the community chooses to fund each of the …ve projects. On any particular project, the 9,000 pro-spending voters and 2,000 of the anti-spending voters vote yes.
Alternatively, the community could use representative democracy to make decisions. In this case, rather than voting on one project at a time, the community instead elects a representative, such as a mayor or a governor, who then makes a decision about each project on the community's behalf. The representative serves as a binding plan for decisions on each Figure 1 : The population of preferences in the example community of these projects. We use the likelihood of agreement rule to determine voters'preferences over candidates, assuming that when deciding between two candidates, an individual votes for the candidate with whom she agrees on the greatest number of spending projects. We can show that this community never elects a representative who votes yes on all …ve projects -that is, they never elect the representative that always agrees with the majority preference.
Suppose there is a pro-spending candidate, a candidate who would vote yes on all …ve projects. The anti-spending voters would be able to agree upon a candidate whom they all preferred to this pro-spending candidate. For instance, they could nominate an anti-spending candidate who would vote no on all …ve projects. In an election between the pro-spending candidate and the anti-spending candidate, the anti-spending candidate would earn the vote of all 10,000 anti-spending voters, since each of them agree with this candidate about four of the …ve projects, while they agree with the pro-spending candidate about only one of the …ve projects. Thus, the anti-spending candidate would earn a majority of the votes when competing with the pro-spending candidate. We can use this reasoning to conclude that in order for a representative to be elected by this community, she would have to vote no on at least some of the projects. Formally, we could show that the pro-spending candidate is not a member of the uncovered set of the tournament over candidates -that is, the candidate that agrees with the majority preferences of the population on all …ve projects cannot be elected.
We've used a political example as a way to discuss our result, but these types of collective decision problems are prevalent in a variety of other settings. Just as communities have to decide which projects to fund, hiring committees must decide which applicants to make o¤ers to and companies must decide which products to develop. This paper makes the point that if a group commits ex ante to a plan of action rather than deciding on issues one at a time, its choices may not respect the majority preference on some issues.
In the last section of this paper, we discuss restrictions on the distribution of preferences that are su¢ cient to guarantee that representative democracy implements the same choices as direct democracy. The su¢ ciency condition we propose can be interpreted as an analog to the well-known single-peakedness result proposed by Black (1948) and Arrow (1951) , as it describes a class of populations for which this form of majority rule (majority rule over candidates) functions well. The domain restriction rules out populations similar to the one depicted in Figure 1 . Populations like those in Figure 1 are problematic because they contain two relatively large groups of like-minded individuals -like the pro-spending and anti-spending groups in our example. Our population restriction rules out these types of bimodal populations. It states that as we move away from the ordering consistent with the majority preferences over alternatives, we cannot encounter another large cluster of similar preferences.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces notation and our models of direct and representative democracy. In Section 3, we explore the structure of the tournaments over candidates and prove that McGarvey's Theorem does not hold in this context. That is, given an arbitrary binary relation, it may not be possible to …nd a population which will generate this relation as the outcome of a tournament over candidates. Section 4 considers the relationship between direct and representative democracy, proving consistency results for the case of n = 3 but negative results for more general problems. Section 5 concludes.
Notation and Model

Notation
We use a …nite and discrete space of alternatives, X = fa 1 ; a 2 ; ::::; a n g. A preference, denoted , is an ordering of the alternatives, where corresponds to a permutation of the integers f1; :::; ng; given the preference = (a (1) a (2) :::a (n) ); a i is preferred to a j if and only if 1 (i) < 1 (j). It will be useful to write e to represent the alphabetical ordering of the alternatives, e = (a 1 a 2 :::a n ) 2 . The set of all n! preferences over X is . A population, , is a distribution over : Let be the set of all distributions over :
We model a candidate as a strict ordering of the alternatives in X. We will write candidate to denote the candidate with ordering .
A choice problem, A X, is a non-empty subset of alternatives; the set of all choice problems is X . To each preference (and candidate), , we can associate a rational choice function, c : X ! X, where for each A, c (A) is the element in A that is preferred to all other elements in A according to . Our model assumes that an elected candidate, , implements choices according to c .
We model these majoritarian systems using tournament theory. A tournament is a complete, asymmetric binary relation. Our analysis considers two types of tournaments: tournaments on the alternative space and tournaments on the candidate space. We use (X) to denote a tournament on the space of alternatives; we reserve the traditional T to refer to a tournament on the space of candidates, T ( ): In both cases, a tournament depends upon the preferences of the population; therefore, we write or T to denote the tournaments generated by a population :
Models of Direct and Representative Democracy
Under direct democracy, members of the population vote over alternatives. We use the majority tournament to model these decisions. In this tournament, the relationship between any pair of alternatives is determined by majority rule:
We write a i a j if a i beats a j in the tournament (X). In the populations we consider below, majority rule over alternatives will be consistent with an ordering. We study this case for two reasons. Firstly, when the majority rule tournament is consistent with an ordering, the normative recommendation for representative democracy is clear: it should select precisely this ordering that is consistent with the direct democracy choices. Thus, this case serves as the most straightforward test of consistency between the two methods. Secondly, we hypothesize that this case has the highest likelihood of leading to positive results, as it minimizes potential sources of distortion. Our negative result for this case suggests we would derive similar negative results in environments where there is additional tension between matching direct democracy choices and producing an ordering. Building a model of representative democracy requires a theory of how individuals choose to vote over candidates. That is, we must map individuals'preferences over alternatives into preferences over candidates. Our goal is to construct a model of representative democracy that is as similar as possible to our model of direct democracy, as this provides the strictest test of our negative result. Because our direct democracy model depends only on preferences over pairs of alternatives, we build a model of representative democracy that uses only this same preference information.
We assume that an individual votes for the candidate with whom she is most likely to agree about the choice from a randomly-selected pair of alternatives. To present this theory formally, we use choice-based metrics. Baldiga and Green (2011) de…ne choice-based metrics on the space of ordinal preferences as follows. First, we de…ne a probability distribution, , over X . Then, the distance between a pair of orderings can be described as the probability that the orderings disagree about the optimal choice from a randomly-selected subset of alternatives.
Our model of representative democracy will use the choice-based metric associated with the distribution over choice problems where each choice problem is a pair, and all pairs are equally likely. This particular choice-based metric is equivalent to the Kemeny distance (also known as the bubble sort distance and the Kendall distance), which de…nes the distance between and 0 as the number of pairs of alternatives the two orderings rank di¤erently (Kemeny 1959 and Kemeny Snell 1962 only if a majority of voters are strictly closer to 0 than . For absolute majority rule, if neither candidate is closer to more than half of the population, the two candidates would tie in the tournament relation.
In our framework, voters will often be indi¤erent between candidates. Each voter has a set of indi¤erence straightforward to check that this binary relation is complete and asymmetric. One could imagine de…ning tournaments over orderings in other ways. However, the tournament over orderings induced by f ( ; 0 ; K ) parallels the tournament over alternatives induced by majority rule in a unique way. They both depend on the same preference information. The tournaments de…ned by f ( ; 0 ; K ) depend only on each voter's pairwise preferences over alternatives, just as the tournaments over alternatives de…ned by majority rule do. Tournaments over orderings induced by other choice-based metrics would take into account voters'preferences over subsets other than pairs, information that is absent from the majority rule tournament over alternatives. This way of de…ning tournaments over orderings serves as a "best case" analysis; it is the environment in which we would expect the most curves: a voter most prefers the candidate with his own ordering, then he equally prefers all candidates with whom he disagrees about the choice from one pair of alternatives, and next he equally prefers all candidates with whom he disagrees about the choice from two pairs of candidates, etc.
Given the large amount of indi¤erence in our population, choosing to use absolute majority rule would result in a large number of ties in our tournaments over orderings. These ties would disregard the information we have on the voters who are not indi¤erent. For instance, in a tie between candidate and 0 , we may have that 30% of the voters are indi¤erent between candidate and candidate 0 , 49% of the voters prefer to 0 , and only 21% of voters prefer 0 to . Despite the large disparity in the number of voters that strictly prefer to 0 as opposed to 0 to , these two orderings would tie in the tournament relation. By using relative majority rule, we use this information on strict preference, even in the cases where large subsets of voters are indi¤erent between the two candidates.
consistency between direct and representative democracy. We prove negative results in this framework, illustrating that even in the case when these forms of direct and representative democracy have the same informational basis, they may not lead to the same outcomes. 2 
Tournament Solutions
We consider only the simplest direct democracy tournaments, restricting our attention to those tournaments generated by populations in which majority rule over alternatives is consistent with an ordering. In these cases, there is a clear winner of the tournament: the alternative which defeats all others in the tournament relation, the Condorcet winner. Furthermore, because there are no cycles, we can describe the tournament by an ordering where each alternative is majority-preferred to all those below it.
However, for general tournaments, including the tournaments over orderings we study below, identifying the winners is non-trivial. In the simplest tournaments, there may be a Condorcet winner, but usually, the tournament relation will cycle. Therefore, we need a tournament solution, a mapping S : T ! 2 n that will determine the best elements given an arbitrary tournament structure. We use the uncovered set as our tournament solution. Miller (1980) provides the …rst characterization of the uncovered set. Here, we follow the de…nition given by Laslier (1997) , applied to our tournaments over orderings. First, de…ne the covering relation of T . For a given T , we say i covers j if and only if:
(a) i T j ; and
The uncovered set of T is the set of maximal elements of the covering relation: i 2 U C(T ) i¤ @ j 2 such that j covers i : As Miller (1980) …rst described, the uncovered set has a number of appealing properties. The uncovered set is always a non-empty subset of the top cycle. And, unlike the top cycle, it contains only Pareto undominated orderings. It is Condorcet consistent: if a Condorcet winner exists, it will be the sole member of the uncovered set. Miller also noted the following game-theoretic interpretation of the uncovered set. Consider the following two-player zero sum game. The feasible strategies are the orderings, 1 ; :::; n 2 . If player i and player j play ( i ; j ), then player i receives a payo¤ of 1 if i T j and a payo¤ of 1 otherwise. Then the set of undominated strategies in this game is exactly the uncovered set of the tournament
The uncovered set also characterizes the outcomes under a variety of familiar voting rules. Miller (1980) and Shepsle and Weingast (1984) have shown that a number of voting procedures under both sincere and sophisticated voting implement elements of the uncovered set. We discuss three broad classes of those procedures here.
The …rst is the amendment procedure under sophisticated voting. The amendment procedure begins with a majority vote over a pair of alternatives. The loser of the pairwise contest is eliminated from contention; the winner of that pairwise contest advances to face another alternative in the next stage. This process continues through n 1 stages, with the surviving alternative selected as the winner. Miller proves that the amendment procedure under sophisticated voting must select a member of the uncovered set as a winner. Further, Shepsle and Weingast show that an alternative a i 2 X can be the sophisticated voting outcome of an amendment procedure agenda containing a j in the …rst stage if and only if a j does not cover a i . In this way, the uncovered set characterizes the set of implementable outcomes under the amendment procedure with sophisticated voting.
Cooperative models of voting also lead to the selection of elements of the uncovered set. Miller shows that when voters may form coalitions and play cooperatively, communicating and making binding agreements to vote together, then any majoritarian procedure will implement an element of the uncovered set.
Finally, Miller discusses a model of strategic two-party electoral competition that chooses elements of the uncovered set. Suppose there are two political parties, A and B. Each party must nominate a candidates from the set of possible candidates 2 . Voters are assumed to have rational preferences over the candidates; they have a dominant strategy to vote sincerely for the party whose candidate they prefer. Under these assumptions, this model is a symmetric, 2-person, zero-sum game for the parties A and B. Miller shows that the set of undominated strategies is exactly the uncovered set of the tournament on . Thus, this theoretical construct, the uncovered set of the tournament, provides a nice characterization of likely outcomes under one stylized model of two-party political systems. 3 These results motivate our use of the uncovered set. By working with this tournament solution, we avoid making speci…c institutional assumptions. Instead, we identify the likely winners under majoritarian voting rules more generally. The negative result we prove in this framework can be applied to any voting procedure which leads to the election of a member of the uncovered set.
Our Approach
We are now ready to pose our question more formally. We consider a population of voters with preferences over a …nite set of alternatives. We look at the choices this population would make under direct democracy by computing the tournament over alternatives induced by majority rule. Then, we determine which candidates this population would elect under representative democracy by computing the tournament over orderings induced by the Kemeny distance. We ask whether the ordering consistent with the majority preferences over alternatives is contained in the uncovered set of the tournament over orderings. This approach is summarized in Figure 3 . 
The Structure of Tournaments over Orderings
We begin by considering the structural properties of the new type of tournament we analyze: the tournament over the orderings. One of the most in ‡uential results in social choice theory is McGarvey' s Theorem. It states that given an arbitrary tournament over a set of n alternatives X, a population of strict preferences exists which will generate this tournament as the outcome of majority rule (McGarvey 1953). Thus, when it comes to majority rule over alternatives, anything goes; the structure of the tournament space over alternatives is unconstrained.
This result does not hold for tournaments over orderings de…ned by the Kemeny distance. Consider an arbitrary binary relation over the orderings. We prove that it is not generally possible to …nd a population that will generate this binary relation as the outcome of the tournament over orderings where voters'preferences are determined by proximity under
That is, the mapping ! T ; K is not onto. This result is interesting from a mathematical standpoint and it is also computationally helpful, as restrictions on the space of tournaments over orderings reduce the number of cases to consider in the analysis that follows.
The additional structure on the space of tournaments over orderings stems from the tournament's reliance on the underlying majority relation over alternatives. We illustrate this dependence with a simple example for the n = 3 case. Recall that the distance between and 0 as measured by the metric f ( ; 0 ; K ) is proportional to the number of pairwise disagreements between the two orderings. Therefore, when determining whether a voter with ordering 00 will vote for candidate or 0 , it is enough to count the number of pairs on which 00 disagrees with each of the two orderings. The candidate with more pairwise choices in common with 00 will win the support of voter 00 . As a result, we can use majority rule over pairs of alternatives to pin down the relationship between certain pairs of orderings in the tournament over orderings. Consider a population whose majority preference over the pair (a 1 ; a 2 ) is a 1 a 2 . This determines the relationship between pairs of candidates whose orderings disagree only about the relative ranking of a 1 and a 2 . For example, consider the pair of candidates a 1 a 2 a 3 and a 2 a 1 a 3 . Since we have a 1 a 2 for a majority of the population, we must have that a majority of the population is closer to a 1 a 2 a 3 than a 2 a 1 a 3 according to f ( ; 0 ; K ). Similarly, we can deduce that a majority of the population is closer to a 3 a 1 a 2 than a 3 a 2 a 1 . If the majority preference on (a 1 ; a 2 ) were reversed, the relationship between both of these pairs of orderings would also be reversed. Therefore, we have:
This makes it clear that there is no population that would generate a tournament such that
Because of the close tie between a population's majority preferences over pairs of alternatives and the tournament relation T ; K , it will be helpful to classify all n = 3 populations according to their majority preferences. The …rst class of populations has a transitive majority preference of the type a 1 a 2 ; a 2 a 3 , and a 1 a 3 . There are six possible majority relations in this class, one corresponding to each of the six possible orderings. We can show that for any one of these transitive majority relations, there are only two possible tournaments over orderings T ; K that can be generated. The second class of populations has a cyclic majority preference; there are only two possible cyclic majority relations: a 1 a 2 , a 2 a 3 , a 3 a 1 and a 2 a 1 , a 1 a 3 , a 3 a 2 . In the Appendix, we show that for either one of these cyclic majority preferences, there are only six possible tournaments over orderings T ; K that can be generated. Thus, we can conclude that in the n = 3 case only 24 of the 32,768 (2 15 ) possible asymmetric binary relations can be generated by a tournament over orderings induced by a population and the metric f ( ; 0 ; K ).
Before we move to our main results, we discuss a few useful observations about the general structure of T ; K . These results again use the majority preferences over alternatives to draw conclusions about the pairwise relationships between certain pairs of orderings.
Proposition 1 Consider a population where majority preferences are consistent with e. Take any ordering that has at least one pair of adjacent alternatives ordered according to e. Obtain 0 by performing one transposition of adjacent alternatives that appeared in the natural order in . Then, we have T ; K 0 for all such 0 . Furthermore, we can take any of these 0 that have at least one pair of adjacent alternatives ordered according to e and obtain 00 by performing one transposition of alternatives that appeared in the natural order in and 0 . Then, we have T ; K 00 .
Proof: Intuitively, when and 0 agree on all but a single pair of alternatives, a voter with the ordering 00 will be closest to whichever of these orderings it agrees with on the pair in the question. Since agrees with the majority preference on the pair in question, more than half of the population must be closer to , yielding T ; K 0 .
We can take this logic one step further to prove the claim for cases where and 00 agree on all but two pairs of alternatives. Denote by the subset of the population that agrees with on the …rst pair in question (the one transposed to obtain 0 ). Denote by the subset of the population that agrees with on the second pair in question (the one transposed to obtain 00 ). Because is consistent with the majority preference on both of these pairs, we know that > . Therefore:
We can rearrange this expression to show that:
The left-hand side of this equation is the fraction of the population that agrees with on both of the pairs in question and will be closer to . The right-hand side of this equation is the fraction of the population that disagrees with on both of the pairs in question and will be closer to 00 . The rest of the population will be equidistant. Thus, the equation tells us that a larger fraction of the population will be closer to than 00 , yielding T ; K 00 .
The following corollary is a straightforward implication of Proposition 1 and will prove useful in the following sections.
Corollary 1 An ordering that is consistent with the majority preferences of a population , call this , must beat all orderings that are fewer than two transpositions away from it; that is, we must have T ; K for all such that f ( ; ; K ) 2:
4 Consistency Results for Direct and Representative
Democracy 4.1 De…ning Consistency
With this knowledge of the structure of tournaments over orderings, we turn now to computing solutions. For our populations, in which the majority preferences over alternatives are consistent with an ordering, there is a clear test of whether representative democracy implements the choices made under direct democracy. We ask whether the ordering consistent with the majority preferences over alternatives is a member of the uncovered set of the tournament over orderings.
De…nition 1 Strong Order Consistency: If majority preferences over alternatives are consistent with an ordering, then this ordering is the sole member of the uncovered set of T ; K .
Or, we might require a weaker condition, which simply requires inclusion of this ordering in the uncovered set of the tournament over alternatives: De…nition 2 Order Consistency: If majority preferences over alternatives are consistent with an ordering, then this ordering is a member of the uncovered set of T ; K .
In the analysis that follows, we show that strong order consistency holds for the case of n = 3 but fails for larger problems with n > 3. Then, we provide a counterexample which illustrates that for n = 10, even order consistency does not hold. 
Consistency for n=3
We exploit our knowledge of the structure of tournaments over orderings to prove results for the n = 3 case for populations with transitive majority preferences consistent with an ordering. Here, we work through the case where a 1 a 2 , a 2 a 3 , and a 1 a 3 . We prove that a population with this underlying majority relation can generate only two possible tournaments. We show that simply knowing the majority preference over the three pairs of alternatives is enough to determine 13 of the 15 pairwise relationships between candidates and the uncovered set of T ; K ; the remaining two relationships, which do not impact the uncovered set, are determined jointly by the relative sizes of the majorities. Our …rst step is to map majority preferences over pairs of alternatives onto T ; K . The majority preference over each of the three pairs (a 1 ; a 2 ), (a 1 ; a 3 ), and (a 2 ; a 3 ) determines the relationship between three pairs of orderings. To see this, we work out the full set of implications of a 1 a 2 .
Let a 1 a 2 . Then, we know:
This inequality implies a set of T ; K relations. As made clear by the middle diagram in Figure 4 , the orderings on the left-hand side of the inequality are closer to a 1 a 2 a 3 than a 2 a 1 a 3 , closer to a 1 a 3 a 2 than a 2 a 3 a 1 , and closer to a 3 a 1 a 2 than a 3 a 2 a 1 . Therefore:
We can do this for each of the three pairs of alternatives, pinning down nine of the relationships in T ; K . Figure 4 illustrates this process.
Next, we can map pairs of majority preferences into T ; K . For instance, since we have a 1 a 2 and a 1 a 3 , we know:
We use a hexagon with an ordering on each vertex to represent the n = 3 space of orderings. Throughout this paper, we'll use an arrow to illustrate a T relationship, with the arrow directed toward the defeated ordering. In the top diagram, the arrows illustrate the three T ; K relationships determined by a 2 a 3 . In the middle diagram, the arrows illustrate the three T ; K relationships determined by a 1 a 2 . In the bottom diagram, the arrows illustrate the three T ; K relationships determined by a 1 a 3 .
The orderings on the left-hand side of the inequality are closer to a 1 a 2 a 3 than a 2 a 3 a 1 and closer to a 1 a 3 a 2 than a 3 a 2 a 1 . Since the other orderings, a 2 a 1 a 3 and a 3 a 1 a 2 are equidistant from each pair of orderings, this is enough to determine the relationship between each of these pairs.
We can draw a similar set of conclusions working from the majority preference of a 1 a 3 and a 2 a 3 , deducing:
Figure 5 summarizes these relationships. Regardless of how the …nal two links are resolved, we see that a 1 a 2 a 3 is the Condorcet winner of the tournament of orderings, beating every other ordering directly. Therefore, we have U C(T ; K ) = fa 1 a 2 a 3 g:
Relating this result to our de…nitions of consistency above, we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 2 For n = 3; U C(T ; K ) satis…es strong order consistency. 
Inconsistency for General Problems
First, we present an example that shows that for n = 4, strong order consistency fails. This proves that for n > 3 there exist populations whose majority preferences are consistent with an ordering but whose uncovered sets of T ; K are multi-valued. Consider the following population:
( ) a
It is clear that the majority preferences of this population are consistent with e = a 1 a 2 a 3 a 4 . But, there is no Condorcet winner of the tournament over candidates. We can show that there exists an ordering, denoted^ such that^ T ; K e. Consider^ = a 4 a 1 a 3 a 2 .
We have f (^ ; a 1 a 4 a 3 a 2 ) < f (e; a 1 a 4 a 3 a 2 ) and f (^ ; a 3 a 4 a 1 a 2 ) < f (e; a 3 a 4 a 1 a 2 ), and we have
As a result,^ T ; K e. And, in fact, we can show that^ 2 U C(T ; K ), with U C(T ; K ) = fe; a 1 a 2 a 4 a 3 ; a 1 a 4 a 2 a 3 ;^ g. We can extend this n = 4 example to a problem with an arbitrary number of alternatives by preserving the structure above for the …rst four alternatives and simply appending additional alternatives in their natural order to the right end of each of the four orderings above. This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 3 For n 4; U C(T ; K ) fails strong order consistency.
This is the strongest result that we can achieve for n = 4, as it is straightforward to demonstrate that for populations whose majority preferences are consistent with an ordering, this ordering must be a member of its uncovered set. Assume majority preferences are consistent with e. We can show that there is no ordering that can cover e. The key step is to recognize that we can apply Proposition 1 to prove that any ordering fewer than …ve transpositions from e cannot cover e: eT ; K for any within two transpositions, so they cannot cover e, and for those three or four transpositions away, even if they beat e, they will be defeated by at least one ordering one or two transpositions from e (which e beats). So, the only orderings that could potentially cover e are …ve or six transpositions away from e: fa 4 a 3 a 1 a 2 ; a 4 a 2 a 3 a 1 ; a 3 a 4 a 2 a 1 ; a 4 a 3 a 2 a 1 g. In the Appendix, we rule these out one at a time, proving that order consistency must hold for n = 4 populations, as e 2 U C(T ; K ) for all populations whose majority preferences are consistent with e. For n 10, we are able to prove a stronger result. We identify populations in which the ordering consistent with the majority preferences is covered. For problems with fewer alternatives, like the one above, we can …nd a^ such that^ T
; K e, but this^ does not beat everything that e beats. That is, we can apply Proposition 1 to …nd a chain of the type eT ; K T ; K^ where is just two transpositions away from both e and^ . In order to prevent these types of chains,^ must be at least …ve transpositions from e. We can do this most simply for problems with at least 10 alternatives. However, as we discuss after the proof, it may be possible to …nd other types of populations that violate order consistency when there are fewer than 10 alternatives.
Theorem 1 For n 10; U C(T ; K ) fails order consistency:
Proof: We prove this through a general counterexample. First, we construct the population. The majority preferences of our population will be consistent with e on all pairs of n alternatives. Select j pairs of alternatives, where 5 j n 2
. Each pair should consist of two adjacent elements in the natural ordering, and all pairs should be mutually exclusive. For example, it would be permissible to select fa 1 ; a 2 g and fa 3 ; a 4 g as two of the pairs, but one could not select fa 1 ; a 2 g and fa 2 ; a 3 g, or fa 1 ; a 3 g and fa 4 ; a 6 g. It will be helpful to have notation for the j pairs; let them be denoted p 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p j . Note that since the pairs consist of adjacent and mutually exclusive alternatives, it is always possible to …nd an ordering that agrees with the majority preference on any particular subset of the pairs fp 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p j g exactly.
We will associate with each of the j pairs a particular ordering, p i , where p i agrees with the majority preference on pair p i , disagrees with the majority preferences on the other j 1 pairs in the set fp 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p j g, and agrees with the majority preference on all other pairs of alternatives.
Allocate the population as follows. Let (e) = . Divide the rest of the population evenly among the orderings f p 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p j g, creating j equal masses of size
It is straightforward to check that this population produces majority rule over alternatives that agrees with e. For each pair not included in fp 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p j g, the population unanimously prefers a i to a i+k , where i 2 f1; ::; n 1g and k 2 f1; ::; n ig. For each of the pairs in fp 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p j g, we have that (
agrees with e. Now we will show that for this population e = 2 U C(T ; K ). We do so by identifying an ordering which covers e: Consider the ordering which disagrees with the majority preferences on all of the pairs fp 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p j g and agrees with the majority preference on all other pairs. Denote this ordering^ . Since we are working with f ( ; 0 ; K ), the distance between any two orderings is, up to a scale factor, the number of pairs over which the two orderings disagree. For simplicity, we'll scale our distances below to the number of pairwise disagreements. First we'll show that^ T e. We have f ( p i ;^ ; K ) = 1 and f ( p i ; e; K ) = j 1 8i 2 f1; :::; jg. Therefore, we have 1 2 + " of the population that is closer to^ than e; so^ T e: In order to prove that^ covers e, we must show that there cannot exist a 0 such that eT 0 but 0 T^ . Suppose there did exist such a 0 .
We have that eT 0 . This implies that we have f (e; p i ; K ) f ( 0 ; p i ; K ) for at least some i 2 f1; :::; jg. Because we know f (e; p i ;
j 1 for at least some i 2 f1; :::; jg:
We also know that 0 T^ . Then we must have that f (
least some k 2 f1; :::; jg. We know that f (^ ; p k ; K ) = 1 for all k 2 f1; :::; jg; which implies that f ( 0 ; p k ) 1 for at least some k 2 f1; :::; jg:
Finally, we know that f ( p i ; p k ; K ) 2 for any i; k 2 f1; :::; jg:
This creates the following violation of the triangle inequality:
2, and f ( 0 ; p i ; K ) j 1, where j 5:This is a contradiction.
Therefore, there can exist no 0 such that eT 0 but 0 T^ . As a result, we can conclude that^ covers e:
This proof describes a method for constructing populations for which direct and representative democracy yield di¤erent choices. It shows that when there are 10 or more alternatives, it is always possible to construct a population such that the majority preferences are consistent with an ordering but the uncovered set of T ; K does not contain this ordering. These populations have a rather intuitive interpretation. Let's think about a population constructed by the method above for the case of n = 10. First, we note the distinction between the …ve "contested" issues (fa 1 ; a 2 g; fa 3 ; a 4 gfa 5 ; a 6 gfa 7 ; a 8 gfa 9 ; a 10 g) and the other 40 pairwise choices which are decided unanimously. The largest mass of voters, just under half of them, have the preference e. Let's call these our "mainstream"voters. The remaining voters are divided evenly among …ve smaller minority preferences. Each minority agrees with the mainstream preference on just one of the contested issues; on the other hand, each minority group agrees with every other minority group on three of the …ve contested issues. In this way, the minority preferences are all more similar to one another than to the mainstream voters.
Let's think about the choices this population would make under direct and representative democracy. When voting directly over the alternatives, the population implements choices consistent with e. Most of the choices are unanimous; and, for the …ve contested pairs, the mainstream voters and one of the minority groups form a majority. Though the minority groups have similar preferences, when voting issue-by-issue, they never vote all together on a contested issue. As a result, the mainstream voters are able to implement their preferred choices. We can contrast this with the dynamic under representative democracy. In this setting, candidate e cannot be elected. Though e attracts the mainstream voters, there exist candidates which all …ve minority groups prefer to e. Consider candidate^ , which agrees with the unanimous choices of the population but disagrees with the majority preference on the …ve contested pairs. All …ve minority preferences prefer^ to e; together, they consist of a majority of the population and can succeed in electing this compromise candidate. The choices of the selected candidates in representative democracy are more closely aligned with the minority preferences than the choices under direct democracy. The ability of the minority groups to compromise under representative democracy produces choices that are di¤erent than those implemented under direct democracy but that are preferred by more than half the population.
While our model is quite di¤erent, our results echo the …ndings of Besley and Coate (2008), who study the question of whether citizens'initiatives, which allow citizens to cast votes directly over issues, improve upon the outcomes reached under electoral competition among representatives. Their model consists of a two party political system, where the population makes decisions in a two-dimensional policy space. Using this framework, they show that the elected candidates may implement policies that are odds with the majority preferences of the population. They attribute these errors to the bundling of issues that is inherent in the election of a representative. As in our model, when issues are decided upon concurrently, via the choice of a representative, decisions may diverge from those made when citizens are able to vote directly over issues, one at a time. Ahn and Oliveros (2012) prove a similar result in the case where individuals'preferences over issues are not separable. Our paper shows that even in the case where there are no complementarities or substitutabilities across issues, the bundling of choices may be distortionary.
The mechanics behind this result also reveal a connection to the political science literature on vote trading, or log rolling (see Tullock 1970, Riker and Brams 1973) . A vote trade may occur when two voters (or parties) are on opposite sides of two issues, with each being a pivotal voter on exactly one the two. In these circumstances, both voters may stand to gain by agreeing to vote against their true preference on the issue in which they are pivotal, in exchange for the other doing the same. Through these types of vote trades, voters may succeed in implementing their preferred choices on the issues they value most, when they would otherwise have been out-voted by the majority. A sizable literature exists documenting the potential for this type of vote trading to alter outcomes under majority rule. As Schwartz (1977) observes, in cases in which majority rule does not cycle and thus would lead to a unique, stable outcome, the outcome under vote trading can be di¤erent. While the speci…cs of the two models are rather di¤erent, the underlying intuition is similar. In the model presented here, representative democracy, like vote trading, provides a way for small parties to impact choices through joint action. By each sacri…cing their preferred choice on one issue, the minority parties are able to agree upon a compromise candidate which is an improved outcome for all of them.
While our result is similar in spirit to the vote trading literature, we point out that it is rather di¤erent from most other negative results about majority rule because it does not stem from a problem of cyclical collective preferences. It would be less surprising to …nd inconsistencies between direct and representative democracy when there was no ordering consistent with the direct democracy choices. But in our example, there is no tension between producing an ordering and matching the majority preferences of the population. Additionally, the divergence noted here is distinct from the type of con ‡ict that has been identi…ed between majoritarian methods and scoring rules in the work of Saari (see Saari 1995) . For the populations in the counterexample above, the ordering generated by applying a scoring rule to the preferences over alternatives is exactly the ordering that is consistent with majority rule over alternatives. Thus, the outcome under representative democracy in this setting is at odds with the predictions of most previously-studied voting rules, majoritarian or not, which all agree that e is the "correct"ordering for the population. This makes the result more surprising, and perhaps more troublesome. We have proven the result for a relatively well-behaved population; we expect that for populations with cyclical majority preferences or for which scoring rules and majoritarian methods predict di¤erent outcomes, the choices under direct and representative democracy will diverge to a greater extent. Better understanding the tournaments over orderings associated with more general classes of populations is a topic for future study.
Population Restrictions
A natural question to ask in this context is whether we can impose restrictions on the distribution of preferences that would guarantee order consistency. This domain restriction approach has been adopted by many social choice theorists in attempts to rule out other paradoxical outcomes; perhaps most classic is the single-peakedness restriction pioneered independently by Black (1948) and Arrow (1951) . Their goal was to describe a class of populations for which majority rule over alternatives would not cycle. The domain restriction they proposed requires populations to be unimodal in the sense that all members of the population, for any particular triple of alternatives, must be able to agree on an alternative that is not worst. Assuming the number of voters is odd, this condition is su¢ cient for transitive majority rule.
Clearly, this restriction will not be enough to assure order consistency, as the class of populations we consider in our counterexample above are indeed single-peaked in terms of preferences over alternatives. However, we can use a similar idea, that of restricting the number of modes in the distribution, in order to derive a su¢ cient condition for order consistency in our framework. The class of populations with transitive majority rule consistent with the ordering e can be thought of as having a "peak" or cluster of weight around e. Our su¢ ciency condition says that as we move away from e, we must not encounter another cluster of similar orderings. In order to state this condition more formally, it will be useful to introduce some new terminology. When referring to a population with transitive majority rule consistent with e, we will call any pairwise disagreement with e an error. For example, we will say that an ordering that is m transpositions from e contains m errors. We can state our su¢ ciency condition in terms of these errors. Proof. Suppose e = 2U C(T ; K ). We will show there must exist a set of m errors, m = 5, such that X ( j contains at least 1 2 of these m errors) < . Since e = 2U C(T ; K ), we know there exists^ such that^ covers e. Let^ contain m errors; we know m = 5 in order for^ to cover e. Since^ and e agree on all pairwise choices outside of the m errors, we know that f ( ;^ ; K ) and f ( ; e; K ) are determined only by how many of the m errors contains. Those that have less than 1 2 of the m errors have f ( ; e; K ) < f ( ;^ ; K ). So, suppose the set of orderings that had at least 1 2 of these m errors in common with^ had mass less than 1 2 . Then, we would have
. This would imply eT ; K^ , contradicting^ covers e.
This su¢ ciency condition has a straightforward intuition. If we encounter a population that contains a mass of orderings that are both (a) relatively distant from e, and (b) relatively close to one another, then we may have the type of counterexample presented above. This type of cluster of similar orderings far from e may be able to agree upon a compromise candidate which covers e, but only if together they constitute a majority. The condition rules out this possibility by assuring that no such cluster of mass greater than 1 2 exists. This is a su¢ cient but not necessary condition for order consistency. A gray area exists between the class of populations described in our counterexample above and the class of populations described by this su¢ ciency condition. For populations that fall into neither of these classes, perhaps the best answer to whether e is a member of U C(T ; K ) is it depends.
For some populations that fail the condition above, the distribution of mass on orderings far from e may be too dispersed to agree upon an ordering like^ which could beat everything that e beats. One might ask whether we could improve the su¢ ciency condition by restricting this set of distant orderings to fall within a certain radius of one another. For an example that illustrates why this strategy fails, please see the Appendix.
Discussion
We summarize our results for populations with order consistent majority preferences in the table below. n = 3 n = 4 5 n 9 n 10 strong order consistency p x x x order consistency p p ? x
Order consistency results for 5 n 9 remain an open question. Our strategy here focuses on generating populations by manipulating preferences over mutually exclusive, nonoverlapping pairs. Preferences over one pair of alternatives are independent of preferences over a mutually exclusive non-overlapping pair. As a result, we are able to combine arbitrary preferences over these pairs into an ordering. This makes generating a population with a particular set of majority preferences much simpler. This approach has been fruitful in constructing populations for which order consistency fails, though it may require more alternatives than might be necessary with other approaches. An important question is what is smallest number of alternatives necessary to have order consistency break down.
We have chosen to use the uncovered set as the solution concept for our tournaments. How heavily does our result depend on this choice? One of the attractive features of the uncovered set is that many other popular tournament solution concepts are subsets of the uncovered set (Laslier 1997 ). Therefore, it is possible to extend our negative result to many other solution concepts. This includes the basic re…nements of the uncovered set, the iterated uncovered set and the minimal covering set. It also includes the Banks solution and the Bipartisan set. Another well-studied method for identifying tournament winners is ranking the members of the tournament based upon their victories and losses within the tournament. The most popular of these ranking methods include the Copeland solution, the Markov solution, and the Slater solution, each of which is also a re…nement of the uncovered set.
However, if we expanded our solution concept to the top cycle, which contains the uncovered set, we could prove a positive result. For any population with majority preferences consistent with an ordering, this ordering is a member of the top cycle of the tournament over orderings. We can prove this using Proposition 1. By performing one transposition at a time, each time transposing a pair of alternatives that were ordered according to the majority preference, we can construct a chain, eT
; K :::T ; K , from e to any other ordering . Thus, we must have e 2 T C(T ; K ). But for populations like the one in our counterexample, the top cycle is large; it will contain many other orderings, including our^ . Thus, while order consistency would hold, strong order consistency would fail. Our models operate on populations of strict preferences, however, the negative result that we have identi…ed can be derived in a more basic setting as well. Consider our example from the introduction. We had a population of individuals who each had a yes/no preference on …ve di¤erent spending projects: building a school, repairing a road, improving the library, giving raises to public employees, and restoring a historic landmark. We can apply our same rule for mapping individuals'preferences over alternatives into preferences over candidates. When deciding between two candidates, we assume that an individual votes for the candidate with whom she agrees on the greatest number of issues. In our example, we showed that while the majority preference was to vote yes on each of these …ve issues, under representative democracy, the population never elected the candidate who voted yes on all …ve issues.
This example shows that our result does not depend on our assumption that voters' preferences take the form of orderings. What is important for our result is the existence of multiple issues. Under a direct democracy, voters express preferences over issues one at a time. Therefore, voters who may be very similar with respect to their decisions over the entire set of issues -they would agree most of the time -can end up voting di¤erently on any one particular issue. But in a representative democracy, voters are able to express preferences over the entire set of issues by voting for a candidate. In this way, representative democracy can serve to unite groups of voters with similar, but not identical preferences.
Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce a tournament over orderings as a natural model of majoritarian forms of representative democracy. Instead of looking at pairwise comparisons of alternatives, as traditional tournaments do, our tournaments are built from pairwise comparisons of candidates, modeled as orderings of alternatives. We assume that when comparing two candidates, an individual votes for the candidate with whom she is most likely to agree about the choice from a randomly-selected pair of alternatives.
We …nd that when applied to the same problem, direct democracy, as modeled by tournaments over alternatives, and representative democracy, as modeled by tournaments over candidates, often predict di¤erent outcomes. In fact, even when the choices of the population under direct democracy are consistent with an ordering, the candidate with this ordering may not be selected under representative democracy. We conclude that the choice of institution plays a signi…cant role in determining outcomes. While this is a familiar theme in much of the existing social choice and political economy literature, our result is novel because of the context in which we prove it. We consider a majoritarian method and …nd that even in settings when a Condorcet winner exists, a candidate may be elected who will not implement this alternative in certain choice problems.
Many open questions remain. One avenue to pursue would be considering di¤erent methods for modeling representative democracy. Because we are interested in comparing our results to the outcome of tournaments de…ned by majority preferences over pairs of alternatives, we focus on a model of representative democracy that depends only on the population's preferences over pairs of alternatives. However, it would be interesting to consider tournaments generated by other choice-based metrics, corresponding to di¤erent probability distributions over choice problems. We could ask how the likelihood of a choice problem relates to the probability of representative democracy implementing the outcome recommended by direct democracy. That is, are representative and direct democracy more likely to agree on choice problems which are very likely to be faced?
We could also explore ways of adapting this framework to more applied settings. In this work, we study a simple, abstract model of representative democracy. In most institutional settings, representative democracy has more structure than what we've imposed here: there may be party systems that shape which candidates are available, restrictions on how many issues or alternatives can be decided upon at once, or priority given to status quo alternatives or candidates. And, the process is dynamic. Considering these modi…cations would enrich the model, leading to sharper predictions and perhaps positive results for some forms of representative democracy.
Appendix
Expected Utility Tournaments
In the analysis above, we consider a model of representative democracy generated by the choice-based metric, f ( ; 0 ; K ). Alternatively, we could use an expected utility framework to model representative democracy. To create a cardinal model, we must enrich our basic model in a few key ways. We introduce utility functions over the alternatives, U : X ! R; a utility function, u, assigns a real number to each alternative in X. Then, we rede…ne a population, u , as a distribution over utility functions rather than a distribution over orderings. We can easily generate a model of direct democracy, u (X), via majority preference in this setting:
To de…ne preferences over the candidates, we build up from our basic utility function over alternatives. Consider a member of the population with utility function, u. She evaluates a candidate according to an expected utility function, ! u; :
She evaluates candidate by considering the choices would make from each possible choice problem. She takes a weighted average of the utility of each choice weighted by the likelihood of that choice problem arriving, which is given by : From here, it is straightforward to de…ne a rule for voting over candidates. We say that 0 attracts a majority against if there exists a subset of utility functions, U 1 ;
for all u 2 U 1 . In the case where ! u; ( ) = ! u; ( 0 ), we assume that the votes of those with utility function u are split evenly between and 0 . It is clear that this rule also generates a tournament over the orderings: A natural question to ask is what is the relationship between the ordinal, metric-based model and the expected utility model here. Consider a tournament over orderings generated by a population and a choice-based metric, f ( ; 0 ; ). Is it possible to …nd a population of utility functions, u , that generates this same tournament under ! u; ? In general, the answer to this question is no. And in fact, for general n, there is no expected utility tournament that corresponds exactly to the tournament over orderings induced by f ( ; 0 ; K ): If we restrict our attention to the n = 3 case and those that only put positive probability on choice problems of order two, we can …nd such a mapping. More importantly, despite the fact that the tournaments generated by expected utility and by f ( ; 0 ; K ) may not be identical, the solutions of these tournaments, and the results we proved above, may often correspond.
Proposition 5 Consider a tournament over orderings generated by a population and f ( ; 0 ; K ). For n > 3, it is not generally possible to …nd a population of utility functions, u , that generates this same tournament under ! u; .
Proof: We can show this with a quick counterexample. Let n = 4. Consider a member of the population whose preference is e. We will show that we cannot …nd a utility function u such that his preferences over orderings according to ! u; ( ) are the same as his preferences over orderings induced by f (e; ; K ). We know that for this agent ! u; ( ) must be the same for all such that f (e; ; K ) = 1 9 (these are all the that are exactly one transposition from e). Thus, we must have that u(a i ) u(a i+1 ) = u(a i+1 ) u(a i+2 ) for i 2 f1; 2g. For convenience, let us label this distance u(a i ) u(a i+1 ) = . Now consider the following pair of orderings: a 3 a 1 a 2 a 4 and a 2 a 1 a 4 a 3 . For both of these , we have f (e; ; K ) = . But, in terms of expected utility according to ! u; ( ), when choices are made according to a 3 a 1 a 2 a 4 , an agent with preference e has a utility loss of 2 (for choosing a 3 rather than a 1 from fa 1 a 3 g) plus a utility loss of (for choosing a 3 rather than a 2 from fa 2 a 3 g). When choices are made according to a 2 a 1 a 4 a 3 , an agent with preference e has a utility loss of (for choosing a 2 rather than a 1 from fa 1 a 2 g) plus a utility loss of (for choosing a 4 rather than a 3 from fa 3 a 4 g). So, ! u; (a 2 a 1 a 4 a 3 ) > ! u; (a 3 a 1 a 2 a 4 ) even though f (e; ; K ) = 2 9 for both of these . Therefore, we cannot …nd a utility function that induces the same preferences over orderings as f (e; ; K ) does.
Proposition 6 Suppose n = 3. Consider a tournament over orderings generated by a population and a choice-based metric, f ( ; 0 ; ), with such that (A) 0 only if jAj = 2.
Then it is possible to …nd a population of utility functions, u , that generates this same tournament under ! u; .
We will show that we can …nd a utility function, u, to assign to this member of the population such that his preferences over the orderings induced by ! u; will be the same as his preferences induced by the metric f ( ; 0 ; ). Without loss of generality, let u(a 1 ) = x, u(a 2 ) = y, u(a 3 ) = 0, with x > y > 0. Then, the expected payo¤ from each ordering is: The four relationships in question are governed by the following inequalities, shown simpli…ed here.
It is clear that for all values of p; q; x; and y, 4 implies 3 and that 1 implies not 4. There are …ve possible cases to consider. For each case, we list the relevant ranges of p and q. Then, we list the corresponding preference over orderings induced by for this range of probabilities.
(1) 1 p > p > q : 1, 2, and 3 hold and 4 does not (2) p > 1 p, p > q; (1 q) > p : 1 and 2 hold and 3 and 4 do not (3) p > 1 p, p > q; (1 q) < p : 1 holds and 2, 3, and 4 do not (4) 1 q > q > p : 1 does not hold and 2, 3, and 4 do hold (5) q > p, q > 1 q : 1 and 2 do not hold and 3 and 4 do hold For each case, we must prove that we can …nd a u (values of x; y) such that we deduce the same preferences over orderings when looking at ! u; .
Case 1: Need to show 9 x; y such that 1, 2, and 3 hold and 4 does not. In this case, since p < (1 q), 1 implies 2. Therefore, we only need to check:
Since the left-hand side is weakly less than 1, we just need to check that p < 2p + q 1. This holds as long as p < 1 q, which is true in this case.
Case 2: Need to show 9 x; y such that 1 and 2 hold and 3 and 4 do not. In this case, since p < (1 q), 1 implies 2. And, not 3 implies 1. Therefore, we only need to check:
So, we just need to have 0 < 2p + q 1. This holds as long as p > 1 p q, which is true in this case since p > 1 p.
Case 3: Need to show 9 x; y such that 1 holds and 2, 3, and 4 do not. In this case, not 3 implies 1. Therefore, we only need to check:
Since p > 1 q, the left-hand side is less than 1. We just need to check that (1 q) < 2p + q 1. This holds as long as p > 1 q, which is true in this case. Case 4: Need to show 9 x; y such that 1 does not hold and 2, 3, and 4 do hold. In this case, 4 implies 3 and not 1. Therefore, we only need to check:
Since the left-hand side is weakly less than 1, we just need (1 q) > p, which is true in this case.
Case 5: Need to show 9 x; y such that 1 and 2 do not hold and 3and 4 do hold. In this case, 4 implies 3 and not 1. And, since (1 q) > p, we have not 2 implies 4. Therefore, we only need to check:
We just need (1 q) < p + q, which is true in this case since q > 1 q. By exhausting these …ve cases, we've completed our proof. We've shown that for any n = 3 tournament over orderings generated by a population and a choice-based metric, f ( ; 0 ; ); with such that (A) 0 only if jAj = 2; it is possible to …nd a population of utility functions, u , that generates this same tournament under ! u; .
Despite the di¤erences between the choice-based metric models and the expected utility models, the counterexample presented in Section 4 does work for a family of expected utility generated tournaments. Restrict all members of the population to the same scale of cardinalization; that is, each utility function assigns the alternative in the ith spot the same real number 8i 2 1; :::; n. Then if u(a k ) u(a k 1 ) = u(a k 1 ) u(a k 2 ), the counterexample is still valid. While the structure of the tournament over candidates may be slightly di¤erent, we would still have that e is covered by our^ . Furthermore, holding …xed any particular utility function, common to all members of the population, it is likely possible to construct counterexamples that would allow us to prove an expected utility analog to 4.3. This is a topic for future work.
Cyclic Populations 6.2.1 De…ning Consistency
Here, we consider a few reasonable notions of consistency between direct and representative democracy for cyclic populations. In the next subsection, we'll use these concepts to evaluate cyclic populations for n = 3.
Our …rst notion of consistency makes an e¤ort to adapt the idea of order consistency to the case of cyclic populations. While majority preferences over alternatives are not generally consistent with an ordering, the Kemeny rule provides a way to identify an ordering that is "closest" to the population's preferences (Kemeny 1959, Kemeny and Snell 1962) . The Kemeny ordering is the ordering which minimizes the expected distance to a randomly-drawn member of the population, where distance is given by f ( ; 0 ; K ):
In the case where the population's majority preferences are consistent with an ordering, this ordering is the Kemeny ordering. This suggests a reasonable pair of consistency conditions for our tournament comparison:
De…nition 3 Strong Kemeny Order Consistency: For any population, ( ;
De…nition 4 Kemeny Order Consistency: For any population, ( ;
Requiring the membership of the Kemeny ordering in the uncovered set of the tournament over alternatives is one intuitive operationalization of consistency in this context. It asks that the ordering that best …ts the population's majority preferences be selected as a winner of the tournament over orderings. Given that we de…ne our tournaments over orderings by f ( ; 0 ; K ), it seems plausible to expect that the Kemeny ordering be a member of
We know, however, that the Kemeny method is just one way of producing a representative social ordering from a population of individual rational preferences. As Arrow's Theorem and the rich literature that followed has shown, there is no clear answer as to what ordering best represents the majority preferences of the population (Arrow 1951) . Therefore, when developing a notion of testable consistency for our framework, it may be appealing to employ a more ‡exible concept. Instead of looking for any particular ordering in the uncovered set, we could ask that the orderings in U C(T ; K ) simply rank highly the winners from the tournament over alternatives. To formalize this concept, we de…ne weak consistency:
De…nition 5 Weak Consistency: Suppose a i 2 U C( (X)) and a j = 2 U C( (X)). Then, for any 2 U C(T ; K ); we do not have a j precedes a i .
This axiom requires that members of U C(T ; K ) rank alternatives in U C( (X)) above elements that are not in U C( (X)). In the case where there is a Condorcet winner among alternatives, a i = U C( (X)), weak consistency requires that a i be ranked …rst in any ordering in U C(T ; K ). Note that in contrast to the notions of consistency proposed above, weak consistency does not make any statements about the ranking of alternatives within U C( (X)). In this sense, weak consistency is more in keeping with the rationale of the uncovered set. Because any alternative within the uncovered set could be a winner under direct democracy, we have no grounds for requiring a speci…c ranking of these elements in the orderings of U C(T ; K ):
Results
For populations with cyclic majority preferences, U C( (X)) = fa 1 ; a 2 ; a 3 g. It is immediately clear that weak consistency will be vacuous in this case, as every alternative is a member of the uncovered set. But we can evaluate our other notions of consistency by looking at the structure of these tournaments. For illustration, we study the case of the cyclic majority preference a 1 a 2 , a 2 a 3 , and a 3 a 1 and prove that this majority preference can generate six possible tournaments with identical consistency properties.
We proceed in the same fashion as above. First, we map majority preferences over pairs onto T ; K . Again, the majority preference over each of the three pairs (a 1 ; a 2 ), (a 1 ; a 3 ), and (a 2 ; a 3 ) determines the relationship between three pairs of orderings. As shown in Figure 7 , the only wrinkle is the reversal of the relationship between the pairs of orderings that depend on the majority preference of (a 1 ; a 3 ).
Because we no longer have that a 1 a 3 , we cannot employ the technique of combining information about pairs of majority preferences over pairs. Instead, we have to rely on information about the strength of majorities in order to ‡esh out the rest of the tournament relation. We know that for a given cyclic majority preference, we can rank the strength of the majority for each pair; so, we can identify a strongest link (the pair for which the size of the majority is largest) and a weakest link (the pair for which the size of the majority is smallest).
Suppose in our example that the weakest link is a 3 a 1 . The fact that a 3 a 1 is supported by a smaller majority than a 1 a 2 yields the following inequality:
We can determine two pairs of T Figure 8 for a diagram of these relationships. In the top diagram, the three arrows illustrate T ; K relationships determined by a 2 a 3 . In the middle diagram, the three arrows illustrate T ; K relationships determined by a 1 a 2 . In the bottom diagram, the three arrows illustrate T ; K relationships determined by a 3 a 1 . Figure 8 : The dashed arrows are determined by the fact that a 3 a 1 is supported by a smaller majority than a 1 a 2 and that a 3 a 1 is supported by a smaller majority than a 2 a 3 :
We are left with the same two relationships to determine as we had in the transitive case; here, however, the uncovered set of the tournament over orderings will depend on the resolution of these links, as a 1 a 2 a 3 is no longer a Condorcet winner. Again we can turn to the relative strength of the majorities in favor of (a 1 ; a 2 ) and (a 2 ; a 3 ). Suppose that the strength of the majority for preference for a 1 a 2 is greater than the strength of the majority preference for a 2 a 3 . Then we deduce that [ (a 1 a 3 a 2 ) + (a 3 a 1 a 2 )] > [ (a 2 a 1 a 3 ) + (a 2 a 3 a 1 )], and we must have a 1 a 3 a 2 T
; K a 2 a 1 a 3 and a 3 a 1 a 2 T ; K a 2 a 3 a 1 . If we instead have that the strength of the majority preference for a 2 a 3 is greater than the strength of the majority preference for a 1 a 2 , then both of these T ; K relationships would be reversed. Therefore, for a given cyclic majority relation, we can have six possible tournaments. The di¤erences stem from what pairs are supported by the weakest and strongest majorities: there are three possible weakest links, and each weakest link can be paired with two possible strongest links.
We can check these uncovered sets for Kemeny order consistency and see that it is always satis…ed. The Kemeny winner of each tournament is the ordering which breaks the cycle at its weakest majority: in the top row, when the smallest majority is a 2 a 3 , ( ; K ) = fa 3 a 1 a 2 g, in the middle row, when the smallest majority is a 3 a 1 , ( ; K ) = fa 1 a 2 a 3 g, and in the last row, when the smallest majority is a 1 a 2 , ( ;
in every case we have ( ; K ) 2 U C(T ; K ) and we see that Kemeny order consistency is Figure 9 : The above diagram illustrates the uncovered sets for the six possible tournaments in the cyclic case. A circle around the ordering indicates that is a member of the uncovered set; an X through the ordering indicates that it is covered. The top row features the two tournaments generated when a 2 a 3 is supported by the smallest majority: on the left is the tournament generated when a 1 a 2 is strongest, one the right is the tournament generated when a 3 a 1 is strongest. In the second row, a 3 a 1 is supported by the smallest majority (a 1 a 2 strongest on the left, a 2 a 3 on the right). In the third row, a 1 a 2 is supported by the smallest majority (a 2 a 3 strongest on the left, a 3 a 1 on the right). While some of these tournaments have the same uncovered sets, no two of these tournaments are identical.
always satis…ed for any n = 3 population. But, strong Kemeny order consistency fails for cyclic tournaments, as the Kemeny ordering is not the sole member of the uncovered set for the populations above. In all of the cyclic cases, jU C(T ; K )j = 5. Interestingly, note that the ordering covered in any particular case above agrees with the majority preference on two of the three pairs. The three orderings that are always in the uncovered set: a 1 a 3 a 2 ; a 2 a 1 a 3 ; and a 3 a 2 a 1 only agree with the majority preference on one of the three pairs. Thus, while the closest ordering to the majority preferences as de…ned by the Kemeny method is always a member of the uncovered set, agreement with the majority preferences is not in general a good predictor of membership in U C(T ; K ).
We can summarize the results for the n = 3 case with the following proposition:
Proposition 7 For n = 3; U C(T ; K ) satis…es strong order consistency, Kemeny order consistency, and weak consistency.
Therefore, for problems with only three alternatives, our results indicate that direct and representative democracies yield similar policy outcomes. In the case of transitive majority preferences in the population, our model predicts that a candidate selected via representative democracy will implement the same policy choice that would have been agreed upon under direct democracy for any pairwise choice problem. In the case of a cyclic majority preference, the policy predictions under direct democracy are less clear -the uncovered set predicts any of the possible policies could potentially be a winner. Correspondingly, the tournament over orderings identi…es a larger set of electable candidates. Importantly, this set always includes the ordering closest to the majority preferences, the Kemeny winner. However, this set does not include all three orderings that are consistent with the maximal number of direct democracy choices. One of the orderings that makes two of the three choices made under direct democracy is omitted from the uncovered set, while all three of the orderings that make only one of the two choices made under direct democracy are included. Thus, even for the n = 3 case, we see that the policies under direct and representative democracy may diverge for cyclic populations.
Additional Results for n=4
In this section, we prove Proposition 3 stated in Section 4.3. For n = 4, U C(T ; K ) satis…es order consistency. Proof: Assume majority preferences are consistent with e. We show that there is no ordering that can cover e. The key step is to recognize that we can apply Proposition 1 to rule out any ordering fewer than 5 transpositions from e: eT ; K for any within two transpositions, so they cannot cover e, and for those three or four transpositions away, even if they beat e, they will be defeated by at least one ordering one or two transpositions from e (which e beats). So, the only orderings that could potentially cover e are …ve or six transpositions away from e: fa 4 a 3 a 1 a 2 ; a 4 a 2 a 3 a 1 ; a 3 a 4 a 2 a 1 ; a 4 a 3 a 2 a 1 Consider the following population, a slight variant from the example presented in Section 4:
"); we have f ( ;^ ) = 1 and f ( ; e) = 4. And, we know a 10 a 9 a 8 a 7 a 6 a 5 a 4 a 3 a 2 a 1 is closer to^ than e, since it is maximally distant from e. Thus, 1 2 + 2" of the population is closer to^ than e, so^ T
; K e: Now we need to show there cannot exist 0 such that eT ; K 0 but 0 T ; K^ : Suppose there did exist such a 0 . Then, eT ; K 0 implies that for at least one of the orderings in population other than e, f (e; ) f ( 0 ; ). We know there cannot exist a 0 , 0 6 = e, such that f (e; a 10 a 9 a 8 a 7 a 6 a 5 a 4 a 3 a 2 a 1 ) f ( 0 ; a 10 a 9 a 8 a 7 a 6 a 5 a 4 a 3 a 2 a 1 ). So, it must be that this is true for one of the remaining …ve orderings. Since for any of these orderings f (e; ) = 4, we must have f ( 0 ; ) 4 for at least one of those …ve orderings . And, the fact that 0 T
; K^ implies that we have at least one of the following two cases:
1. For at least one of the orderings with weight "), we have f ( 0 ; ) f (^ ; ).
2.
For both e and a 10 a 9 a 8 a 7 a 6 a 5 a 4 a 3 a 2 a 1 , we have f ( 0 ; ) < f (^ ; ).
For case 1, we know f (^ ; ) = 1, so this would imply, f ( 0 ; ) 1 for one of the orderings with weight
"). This leads to the same violation of the triangle inequality that we reached above, since for any two orderings with weight 1 5 ( 1 2 "), we have f ( i ; j ) 2. For case 2, f ( 0 ; e) < f (^ ; e) implies f ( 0 ; e) < 5: And, f ( 0 ; a 10 a 9 a 8 a 7 a 6 a 5 a 4 a 3 a 2 a 1 ) < f (^ ; a 10 a 9 a 8 a 7 a 6 a 5 a 4 a 3 a 2 a 1 ) implies f ( 0 ; a 10 a 9 a 8 a 7 a 6 a 5 a 4 a 3 a 2 a 1 ) < 40. But, f ( 0 ; e) < 5 and f ( 0 ; a 10 a 9 a 8 a 7 a 6 a 5 a 4 a 3 a 2 a 1 ) < 40 cannot both hold, since the …rst implies 0 has fewer than …ve errors and the second implies it has more than 5 errors. This leads to a contradiction. Thus, order consistency fails for this population. This example illustrates the di¢ culty we encounter if we attempt to tighten the su¢ ciency condition for ordering consistency by imposing a radius around the orderings with common errors. Taking the basic counterexample from above, where the minority orderings all lie relatively close to another, we can move some weight to a 10 a 9 a 8 a 7 a 6 a 5 a 4 a 3 a 2 a 1 and still arrive at^ covers e. Thus, it is not always true that we need the minority orderings to be relatively close to one another in order to have order consistency fail.
